A detail that cost United the win against Arsenal, Man Utd v Arsenal match analysis

Before the match at Old Trafford, Arsene Wenger met Mourinho 14 times and failed to get a single victory against his side. Everything he thought about for the Saturday game was useless and, in the end, he was saved by a bit of luck and good intuition. Two changes gave him an assist and a first goal against Mourinho in nine long years to claim a point in a match with Man Utd.
THE CONTEXT

Arsenal came to Old Trafford without defeat since Day 1 of the Premiership wit three wins and two draws in last five matches. Wenger’s team was a clear favourite against the hosts that didn’t connect two wins in a row since August. To make it worse, United had to face Arsenal without suspended Zlatan Ibrahimović and without both starting center backs, Eric Bailly and Chris Smalling. Nevertheless, Mourinho was encouraged by a win in League Cup against Guardiola’s City and two matches in Premiership without a loss. Thus, he ditched six men defence he employed to get some kind of result against Liverpool and Chelsea, and went for relatively open match against Arsenal. Well, to his standards at least.

Although he didn’t park the bus, Mourinho didn’t want to risk too much either. It was yet another difficult game for him since a defeat would settle him back after carefully nurturing his team shaky confidence level in recent games.

MANCHESTER UNITED – DEFENSIVE ORGANIZATION

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United didn’t rush mindlessly into pressing Arsenal and covered spaces in the middle

Above you can see how he, mostly successfully, closed the middle of the pitch forcing Arsenal to build up down the flanks. He was defending zonally oriented on a man while Arsenal was transitioning to the middle third.

He did press Arsenal on his half, however, he did it very selectively. There were two triggers for Man Utd to get out of their defensive shape and close down on opponent in their half.

First trigger were deliberate long balls from their own defensive line. United doesn’t dwell on the ball in their half if they can avoid it. Even less so when opposition is pressing high. Without Ibrahimović upfront, Mourinho instructed his defenders to clear the ball into specific areas. Mainly down the flanks and near the touchline. Reasoning behind this is that receiver of the pass will have less space to cleanly trap the ball. This was the trigger for whole squad to raise their defensive line. Rashford was first man to chase the ball ensuring the receiving full back/defender has also minimal possible time to turn towards United goal and pick his next pass. In meanwhile, midfielders ensured to man mark anyone who could receive that pass. Theoretically this would give Man United a chance to clear the ball on their own terms and react to it with a possibility to win the ball high up the pitch.

Another pressing trigger was largely a reaction to Arsenal actions as United players would defend from front to chase down any back pass to Peter Čeh. The point behind wasn’t really to win the ball high, but to force an opponent to hoof the ball in an uncontrolled manner and then regain the possession since Arsenal lack any strength or aerial ability in the advanced positions. Theoretically, that would allow United to win the ball deep/medium position while opening routes for a quick counter attack when they still had their attacking players in advanced positions against unbalanced defence.

ARSENAL COUNTERING UNITED ZONAL DEFENCE IN MEDIUM BLOCK

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While Arsenal managed to get into the middle third, if Sanchez couldn’t think of something to do with the ball, they were largely without an idea against quite deep and staggered UTD defence

Above you see one of solutions that Arsenal provided to avoid the marking in middle third. One of the weaknesses of man oriented zonal marking is that defender will follow the opponent in his zone. Arsenal is using this with clever off the ball movement from Mesut Ozil and Chilean Sanchez. While Ozil leaves his position in middle towards the right channel, Pogba follows him opening the space. This, in turn, is used by Chilean who drops deep from his central forward position. Depending on reaction of defence, he might have time and space to face goal side or, at least, pick a back/sideways pass.

Arsenal used reverse movement as well to the same effect. At times it was Theo Walcott who would make horizontal movement from right wing position into the centre of the pitch. This would either pull away his marker Darmian or make an overload in the middle. If Darmian followed, a space would open for right back Jenkins to exploit.

MANCHESTER UNITED – OFFENSIVE ORGANIZATION

Due to high value of points in this game (more for the confidence of the team than table position), United was quite reluctant to commit too many men to offensive. This was surely influenced by presence of Theo Walcott who can exploit the space if given. Thus, Darmian largely stayed back together with Michael Carrick to cover for counter attacks. This meant Mourinho had only two central midfielders and Juan Mata to connect their midfield and attack. Despite this, the work rate and off ball ability of Mata/Herrera proved quality more important than quantity.

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While Arsenal was quite solid on defence, the quality of Mata and Herrera provided numerous troubles for them. Above animation is an example of typical movement those two made. Herrera was able to find space and use the ability of Martial’s one trick (cut inside) to receive the pass and unbalance the defence. After Herrera got attention from defence pulling out of the line one of the centre backs there was space behind that was open for Mata to exploit.

This cooperation in the end resulted with seemingly easy finish from Mata from inside the box. However, while it looked pretty straight forward clear chance, it took great deal of composure and technique to connect with such a fast ball. You will notice it was gain a third man’s run that concluded Man United move.

Unlike Mourinho, Wenger was trying to unsettle United defence with number of players in the offensive third. While Sanchez was very effective in a deep lying striker role coming deep to pick a pass, he had no support Mata provided to his team mates. Whenever Sanchez went deep Ozil and Walcott went infield often joined by Ramsey. Unlike United, that failed to give an advantage to Arsenal as their runs were predictable and United defence always had an answer due to deeper stance.

To conclude, United did very well to both, limit Arsenal and create in front of their goal. Visitors were saved by a bit of luck and hunch from Wenger who, midway through the second half, introduced Olivier Giroud and changed the fruitless approach. In the end, Mourinho might be held accountable on the fact he left Rashford on the left flank when Oxlade-Chamberlain was introduced. It was young forward who was supposed to mark Arsenal winger in right back position when fatal cross to Giroud was swung in. Either way, Murinho didn’t get what he wanted despite a solid performance and his team is still looking for confidence although this game seemed a step in right direction. Arsenal on other hand, had a poor performance, especially in the second half and lost the opportunity to challenge the very top of the table. Yet, it is a long season.

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EPL: Leicester v Arsenal analysis, a game nobody wanted to win

It is never good to lose two in a row and it is especially bad if it happens to be first two games of the season. Arsenal and Leicester were both risking that faith before their clash at King Power stadium in Leicester. Neither of managers wanted that as hit on confidence could be determinant on current campaign in Premiership.
While Claudio Ranieri had his best players all available for the match, Arsene Wenger had to bench Mesut Oezil and Olivier Giroud as they aren’t fully fit after EURO. However, he got Laurent Koscielny back in defence and Granit Xhaka in midfield while Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain took place from Iwobi on right wing and Santiago Cazorla replacing injured Wilshire in attacking midfielder role. In comparison with match against Liverpool last week, Arsenal was stronger in defence and deep midfield position.

Although Kante went to Chelsea, Nampalys Mendy seems a good replacement and Leicester is strong in defence as they have always been. To counter that strong double block of four defenders Wenger occasionally employed Bellerin and Monreal to come inside instead of hugging the line.

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Lack of runners from deep was rucial in Arsenal’s ineffectivness to win the match

Above you can see Monreal drifting inside which left Oxlade-Chamberlain alone on the wing. However, as Cazorla has already left his attacking midfielder slot there are no runners from deep to further disrupt the Leicester’s defensive block. The fact that Coquelin and Xhaka were strictly tasked to cover for counter attacks and not to venture forward didn’t help Arsenal cause. However, we have already established that the goal was not to lose second match in a row so that is understandable.

While Arsenal had the advantage in ball possession in first half it seems their fluid movement of front players didn0t really work against Leicester. At point seemed as Sanchez had free role as he was often drifting into Oxlade Chamberlain’s space while Cazorla also moved laterally. Instead of creating confusion in Leicester defence at times it looked more like disorganized attacking that didn’t really threaten the hosts.

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Xhaka is becoming crucial in Arsenal build up. However, front two had so much freedom it hurt them (source: @11tegen11)

Excellent chart from @11tegen11 provides an insight in Arsenal offensive play and you can clearly see Xhaka was playing sort of deep lying midfielder and a heavy involvement of both full backs. The left side is clearly more active as Oxlade-Chamberlain, Sanchez and Cazorla are often drifting left to overload opposition. However, lack of runners from central area doesn’t destabilize the defence and there is very little to show for all the running.

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Arsenal failed to use the width of the pitch which made it easier for  Leicester to defend

Above you see Coquelin well closed down but real problem Arsenal has is that they are plying into hands of Leicester despite all the possession they have. Sanchez and Monreal are too narrow helping the defensive line stay compact and close enough to support each other. There is at least 15 yards of space on left flank Monreal and Sanchez should really use to stretch the defensive block and open up gaps for fast players such as Walcott and Oxlade-Chamberlain to run in. Additionally, positioning of Cazorla is completely out of place. Even if Coquelin wasn’t closed down, he would never be able to receive the pass and all he is doing is bringing defenders closer to Bellerin who is already in tight spot.

Second half opens up much differently as Leicester gets their pressing much higher up the pitch and closes down Arsenal really well. Suddenly it is the visitors who can’t get on the ball and Leicester high tempo gets Arsenal in lot of trouble.

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With second half Leicester played much higher and closed down well preventing Arsenal from creating much even when Oezil came on the pitch

You can see above how high pressing by Leicester really worked. Man on the ball doesn’t really have an option but to clear the ball aimlessly. As second half progressed Leicester won lot of balls high up field to launch quick counter attacks. If direct approach for Vardy couldn’t be used the ball frequently went to right side and Mahrez who would then go either one on one or search for a crossing option.

As game was quickly going out of hands for Arsenal, Wenger replaced Cazorla with Oezil while Oxlade-Chamberlain was substituted with Giroud and Coquelin went out to be replaced by Wilshire. This meant Oezil got more central role while Wilshire was more keen to make forward runs compared to Coquelin. While this might have worked in first half with Leicester sitting deeper, it didn’t really work last 15 minutes as hosts were high, closing down well and Arsenal didn’t have fast players as Oxlade-Chamberlain to exploit the space.

To conclude, Arsenal was way too cautious in the first half with two holding midfielders and while they had the ball Leicester was all happy to rely on quick breaks. Second half went all wrong for Wenger as Leicester players were always first on the ball and sprung attack after attack. In the end both temas will be satisfied with a point as that was the idea before the game.

Better to be born without penis than luck, GERvFRA analysis

After hosts France beat Germany in second EURO semi final we are slowly coming to conlusion of what once was the toughest football tournament in the world. Prior to the game France had quite clear startng line up while Joachim Loew had to make som e hard decisions due to suspensions and injuries.

Since Mario Gomez was injured he had no striker and decided to leave on bench Goetze while Thomas Mueller took most advanced spot in 4-2-3-1 formation. Khedira was out as well and Loew opted for Emre Can instead of Weigel while Hoewedes took the place of Hummels. The biggest problem for Loew was no proper striker in the squad and Khedira’s replacement. However, with Mueller up front Loew was confident he could create chances for others or himself. Style of play was changed since Gomez is less mobile but bigger threat in the air while Can took the role of coming from deep and adding to aerial power in absence of tall striker.

As the game started France came out as if they are going to tear apart Germany but five minutes were enough for Loew’s team to take controll on the pitch. They didn’t differ from their overall approach during the tournament. Plan was to get high, compress the opposition and then to create overload either by passing and movement or to switch the point of attack. Once France didn’t bother to press high, Die Mannschaft had little trouble bringing football forward and compressing France into their own half.

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Loew tried to break deep French defence by sending his center backs forward to create numerical advantage

Above you see a prototype of modern center back as Boateng is entering his midfield line to create a spare man. Advancing full backs are always creating an option on the wing, but what Loew preferes is overload in midfield which is allowed once Boateng enters the zone unopposed. He has number of options infront and Schweinsteiger with Kroos on his sides who can support him if he gets closed down. However, that isn’t preferred option. Actual plan is for Mueller to drag away Coscielny who leaves a gap for Draxler to get in and receive the ball.

France had great trouble stipping these passes through the middle and were only lucky not to get punished. You can see below how french failed to cope with their opponents roaming through their zones of responsability. Oezil is free on the ball and has an easy pass to Mueller who is coming to receive the pass. Before the move is over Die Mannschaft has created an overload on Payet and Mueller passes quick ball to flank for Kimmich who can go one on one with Patrice Evra and look for cut back, cross or recycle the possession with Oezil again.

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Despite France allowed numerous passes between lines, Germany didn’t have a man to convert chances created

Emre Can had an important role here as, while Oezil looked to drop deeper, Can was taking his position ready for run into the box replacing Gomez as an aerial threat in case his team mates chose to cross the ball. Despite numerous passes through French defensive lines, Germany failed to get anything out of their domination in the first half. One individual mistake from experienced Schweinsteiger gave Griezmann opportunity to score and he took it happily.

Germany had to be very disappointed going into the dressing room as they controlled the match and, while they didn’t create any extraordinary chances, France wasn’t any better. Start of second half was the same as the first with France pushing early on and then getting compressed in their half again.

While without the ball, Germany was, unlike France, trying to press high and disturb French transition into the middle third. It worked reasonably well but apart occasional break, French were always ready to get back and cover. Germany didn’t change their approach as they must have been fairly confident they will score with all the possession. However, another individual mistake, this time from Kimmich who carelessly lost the ball in his own area, essentially ended the game.

French kept to their feeble defending that Germany wasn’t able to break mainly due to lack of any inspiration from Mueller or Oezil and some great defending from new Barcelona star Samuel Umtiti.
As time went on Germany was ever more desperate since nothing they did went in, and France was happy to override its own midfield and ping direct long balls to Griezmann who was kind of player Germany missed to make this trully classic match.

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French were happy to send long direct balls for in form Griezmann bypassing their midfield while Mueller disappointed not being able to get on the ball. If that was Gomez, it would be fine, but player as Mueller should have participated more  (diagram source: @11tegen11)

If you look above you can see Fraance mainly attacked down left without trying to involve Pogba or Matuidi in the center. Deschamps put all his faith in Griezmann – Giroud partnership and got it right. Germany will be heavily disappointed with Mueller who was completely lost between French center backs.

To conclude, what Germany was lacking was an inspired player that France had in Griezmann for whole tournament. Their defending was apalling at times but theere was no one there who was able to punish it. In the end, they were collectively punished by elimination. Was Loew able to do something to overturn result? Not really, Germany had sound plan and executed it reasonably, just as French did. They didn’t have any luck though, and as they say were I come from, it is better to be born without a dick than without luck.

EURO Italy v Germany: How Loew stopped Italy, an analysis

Highly anticipated Euro quarter final between Germany and Italy didn’t disappoint even if only one goal was scored from open play and the game itself dragged through the extra time and then penalties. In the end Simone Zaza, who made more steps running up for penalty than in actual game, together with Pelle, Bonucci and Darmian sealed the faith of Italy while Jonas Hector brought Die Mannschaft through to the semis.
It wasn’t only the name and reputation of the teams that made the game intriguing. That little bit was added up by two managers who were up against each other and were expected to make few surprises for their counterpart. In the end it was JoachimLoew who came up with tactic that mirrored his opponent to cancel Italy out of the game. Conte had little space for manouver as, already mediocre individual quality of his players, was furtherdepletedd by injuries to Candreva and De Rossi while his back upThiago Motta got suspended.

German manager stated after the game he decided immediately after Italy v Spain match how his team is going to confront Italians. Easier said than done. It was a surprise when official team sheets for Germany came out with positions marked on the pitch. It is always a risk for manager to change the shape of the team in just four days and for such an important game. However, Germany showed its versatility and individual class to adopt so well and counter the team that masterfully countered everyone else, including the defending champion Spain.

Germany had a plan to defend three different situations when Italy had the ball and they all had the same goal. Prevent the ball easily reach either of the forwards.

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First rule of playing against Conte: Don’t let them easily move the ball forward

At goal kicks Joachim Loew set up marking tasks to block passing lanes but also to immediately pressure any player Buffon would hastily pass the ball. This forced Italian goalkeeper to punt the long balls forward where Germany had numerical advantage to win any second balls.

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Second rule of playing against Conte: If they get on the ball in defence, mark the strikers tightly and cover passing lanes to middle zone

Once the ball reached Italian defensive line, and if his team wasn’t able to press immediately, they went to block passing lanes into the middle zone from front. Lot of credit has to be given to Mueller and Gomez as well as Oezil who was joining them in this. You can see above how they looked to cover the midfield letting the Italian defenders on the ball. Although Bonucci and Chiellini are exceptionally dangerous when they are allowed time and space to pick the pass this was fine as last line of German defence had time to man mark Pelle, Eder and Giaccherini who was often playing as third attacker making runs from deep. Wide players, Kimmich and Hector are in half spaces ready to support Kroos and Schweinsteiger as well as their direct match ups. This combination of man marking in last line of defence and passing lane block in the first line ensured two things.

Italy had eventually to punt the ball forward where Loew’s men had a spare man (Hummels in this case) and firmly marked opposition ready to get to any second balls, or risk making a mistake and lose position very deep in their own half.

However, whenever opportunity presented, Germany would press immediately the carrier of the ball with the aim to push him to sidelines and then gang up to take the ball and counter. This wasn’t particularly successful, however, you can see below they managed to tackle the ball carrier six times during 90 minutes of play and intercept it twice in Italy own half.

Even when on the ball Germany positioned itself on the pitch very high to congest the space for Italy forwards who need the space as they drop deep. This worked well for Loew as even when they lost the ball Germany could execute quick counter press to win the ball back high up the pitch.

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Third rule of playing against Conte: Even when you have the ball push high so if you lose it you can counter press quickly and deny space for their strikers who’d love to drop deep before spreading the play down wings

Although we didn’t see too much from Italy in the first half mainly because defensive phase of Die Mannschaft, elaborated above worked so well, Italy managed to show what happens when defence loses concentration for a moment on image below. All principles of German defence failed to kick in and in 43rd minute Italy was allowed unopposed possession in middle zone. Germany had a backup plan but even that failed.

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If all the above rules fail, set up the offside trap but take care of Giaccherini’s run from midfield

As Bonucci picked up a ball unopposed German defence pushed up to make an offside trap successfully leaving out of play Eder and Pelle. However, Kimmich fails to react in time and lags behind just enough for Giaccherini’s trade mark run from deep. Schweinsteiger has forgotten him and was moving out with defensive line to set up off side. Didn’t take long for Bonucci to spot that deep run as it is rehearsed move and hi lofted a long ball over the defence for Bologna midfielder to run on to. Despite a cut back and follow up shot by Sturaro Italy fails to punish rare mistake from German defence.

First half finished as a hard fought battle with Germany more in possession due to Italy playing a waiting game, similar to their first match against Belgium. Die Mannschaft countered this very well mimicking Italian shape and had more options in attack. However, that was cancelled out by great defensive effort from Italy.

While both teams were defending in very similar fashion, except Italy was less eager to press high up the pitch, they attacked quite differently. Above example from Italy is their typical move and their limited squad offered little diversity to what was seen before. It was either long ball from Bonucci to on rushing Giaccherini or for strikers who dropped deep to receive the ball and spread it to wings. If opportunity arose, they would quickly combine to get directly to goal. However, Loew had all those moves well studied and largely prevented.

Germany, on other hand offered much more versatility going forward. Frequent rotations of offensive players had Italian defence constantly on toes. Additionally, Germany didn’t hesitate to move both outer central defenders, Hummels and Hoewedes, up the pitch where Hoewedes would often overload right side with Schweinsteiger, Mueller and Kimmich while Kroos was dropping deeper to help out Boateng.

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Even if Germany pushed their center backs forward, they only broke Italy on penalties

Above you can see how far Hummels went to create overload, same happened on the other side where Hoewedes would go high (although, not with the ball). This high positioning of center backs drained slowly drained the energy from Italian team that had to defend and keep concentration high throughout the match. Finally, Germany scored due to overload on left and cut back for Oezil who wasn’t tracked as he was running from deep.

Italy was lucky to equalize fairly quickly from a lucky penalty but the game essentially change little from second half till the end. Germany was ever more dangerous with numbers and towards the end of 90 minutes Italy switched to 5-4-1 with Eder dropping back to cover for German CB’s going forward.

There were few key areas that shaped the game. First, Joachim Loew who decided to mimic Italian shape in order to cancel it out and, consequently, Germany defence from front. Both teams defended extraordinarily well but Germany did it so well that they defended even when they had the ball. Pushing central defenders high up the pitch allowed them to regain possession quickly with counter pressing when they lost the ball and also provided them with more players in offensive zone to control the possession tiring Italy out.

In the end, limited Italian talent stifled Antonio Conte and his ability to change anything in a way he attacked, he made most with this squad and only penalties denied Italy the chance to progress to semis beating current World Champions.

Germany too German for Slovakia – an analysis

Sometimes you stumble upon a game of football where usual rules of minnow having always a chance just doesn’t apply. Die Manschaft was so overpowered and early goal didn’t fool them at all. They kept plugging and took themselves so seriously that Slovakia could do very little on the day. Germany was huge favourite in this match up and prepared as such.
They went for high pressing in offensive zone and despite not being able to win any significant advantage in terms of scoring chances, they did manage to disrupt ball distribution of Slovakia team very well.

Once Germany got possession they relatively slowly went up field controlling possession and taking their passes wisely. After all they are blessed with two center backs, Boateng and Hummels who can distribute ball and once Joachim Low decided to put Gomez in CF slot, they were dangerous from all positions.

The versatility of their attack is impressive. They can go on solo runs via individual quality of Draxler, Muller, Ozil… Creativity of players such as Kroos, Ozil and Muller allows them to use vertical through balls… Off the ball skills of Muller, Ozil, Draxler serves them well to receive those balls… Potent full backs allow them to overlap and overload wide areas as well as cross for tall and strong Gomez that is still a class striker. He might lack technical ability to play wall balls, but there are Ozil, Muller and Draxler to compensate.

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Everybody participates in German play, a true team effort

They don’t just have those possibilities, they also use them. Germany is extremely versatile on the ball and they can hurt you however they want, or, wherever you are weak. If you take a look at the diagram from @11tegen11 above, you can see ball usually travels via Kroos who is playing sort of deep lying play maker, but you also notice Germany is using all players in roughly equal manner emphasising that versatility. They go left, right and centre. Lone player who seems cut off is Mario Gomez. However, his role of designated finisher is the reason. When Goetze plays false nine role that changes, but that kind of approach puts them in cul de sac position too much as they try and pass the ball in the net with so many creative players upfront. With Gomez their game looks much more clean and efficient.

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Above is an example how far two centre backs go with Hummels and Boateng deep in Slovakia half. Slovakia defence is all set up in two banks of four but off ball movement of Kroos, Draxler and Muller is quickly disrupting well positioned defence and Hummels can chose where to pass as defenders are occupied by number of opposition players that exchange positions.

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A team can defend these movements so long as it is keeping its shape. Above you see what happens once a defensive shape collapses. Slovakia Right winger Kucka failed to block the pass or mark the overlapping Hector and at this point the Slovakia defence collapses. Hector plays it quickly into space for onrushing Draxler coming from inside. In meanwhile, Horovsky has to cover for Pekarik who had to cover for Kucka. Once Draxler is one on one with Horovsky he uses his skills to go past. Collapsing defence chain reaction continues as now Skrtel has to step up and cover for Horovsky, This leaves Gomez in front of his marker Durica and as Skrtel is late to close down Draxler, German CF has little trouble to put Germany two nil in front.

It all happened some 35-40 meters away and quickly escalated to goal after only one mistake that Draxler used really well to go by his marker and pass it for easy finish.

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Above you can see how high RB Kimmich plays widening the field. This allows Muller to come deeper and inside, looking for his forward runs between the defenders breaking through the pentagon created by his team mates. Notice how whole German side shifts as Ozil goes wide in place of Muller while Draxler pushes inside to allow more space for Hector (out of picture) to receive the ball without pressure.

Slovakia could do little against their opponents on the day. Early goal and impeccable movement as well as high pressing constrained them to look how to survive. Once Germany was firmly set on result they came out much more cautious in the second half and Slovakia tried to change their fortunes. Their manager Jan Kozak decided to break German dominance in midfield. Substitution of Weiss by CM Sestak meant that Hamsik is free to go more forward. Although, Slovakia retained retaining 4-3-3 formation, Hamsik didn’t play as wide as Weiss and Kucka came more central as well. This allowed Slovakia to control the central zone better letting the Germany have wide areas.

However, Germany changed their approach in second half. Their Full backs didn’t go so aggressively forward while Boateng and Hummels occupied much deeper position. Additional security was given to Kross who was often sitting between centre backs in possession.

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Above is an example of more conservative German play with RB Kimmich and LB Hector playing much deeper while Ozil is making horizontal movement between the lines to search the space for a pass. Although Slovakia looked more lively the third goal and, again, poor marking at corner, allowed Draxler to score the third goal which made the game effectively over. Slovakia didn’t have nor quality nor will to make any significant change to the game.

Only changes that were made were those that saved Khedira and Howedes from receiving the yellow card that would make them unavailable for quarter final.

While in theory minnows can upset favourites, that needs quite a few additional factors. Poor day of opposition, luck, an extraordinary defensive performance, an inspired player… Slovakia didn’t have anything and confronted highly professional German teams that knew what to do and how to do it.